We study online learning in repeated first-price auctions with censored feedback, where a bidder, only observing the winning bid at the end of each auction, learns to adaptively bid in order to maximize her cumulative payoff. To achieve this goal, the bidder faces a challenging dilemma: if she wins the bid-the only way to achieve positive payoffs-then she is not able to observe the highest bid of the other bidders, which we assume is iid drawn from an unknown distribution. This dilemma, despite being reminiscent of the exploration-exploitation trade-off in contextual bandits, cannot directly be addressed by the existing UCB or Thompson sampling algorithms in that literature, mainly because contrary to the standard bandits setting, when a positive reward is obtained here, nothing about the environment can be learned.
up winning the final bid. For instance, when there are two exchanges and the two bids on the first exchange are 3 and 5, while the two bids on the second exchange are 10 and 1. Then on the first exchange, the second bidder would win the bid at 3 while on the second exchange, the first bidder would win the bid at 1. Since 3 is larger than 1, when those two winning bidders get aggregated, the second bidder from the first exchange would win the final bid, despite the fact that the first bidder from the second exchange is willing to pay 10. Note that this problem would not have occured if first-price auctions were used: the highest bid among all bidders would be the same as the highest of the highest bids of all exchanges.
As a result of these advantages, several exchanges (e.g. AppNexus, Index Exchange and OpenX) started to roll out first-price auctions in 2017 [Slu17] , and Google Ad Manager (previously known as Adx) completed its move to the first-price auctions at the end of 2019 [Dav19] . Of course, it also goes without saying that first-price auctions have also been the norm in several more traditional settings, including the mussels auctions [vSK + 01] (see [Esp08] for more discussion). However, despite these merits, this shift brings forth important challenges to bidders since the optimal bidding strategy in first-price auctions is no longer truthful. This thus leads to an important and pressing question, one that was absent in second-auctions prior to the shift: how should a bidder (adaptively) bid to maxmize her cumulative payoffs when she needs to bid repeatedly facing a first-price auction?
Needless to say, the rich literature on auctions theory has studied several related aspects of the problem. Broadly speaking, there are two major approaches that provide insights into bidding strategies in auctions. The first (and also the more traditional) approach takes a game-theoretic view of auctions assuming a Bayesian setup where the bidders have perfect or partial knowledge of each other's private valuations modeled as probability distributions. Proceeding from this standpoint, the pure or mixed (Nash) equilibria that model rational and optimal outcomes of the auction can be derived [Wil69, Mye81, RS81] . Despite the elegance offered by this approach, an important shortcoming of this game-theoretic framework is that the participating bidders often do not have an accurate modeling of one's own value distributions. Consequently, these value distributions are even more unlikely to be known to other bidders or the seller in practice [Wil85] .
Motivated to mitigate this drawback, the second (and much more recent) approach is based on online learning in repeated auctions, where the participants can learn their own or others' value distributions during a given time horizon. Under this framework, a flourshing line of literature has been devoted to the second-price auction, mostly from the seller's perspective who aims for an optimal reserve price [MM14, CBGM14, RW19, ZC20] . There are also a few papers that take the bidder's perspective in the second-price auction [McA11, WPR16] , where the bidder does not have a perfect knowledge of her own valuations.
However, to date, the problem of learning to bid in repeated first-price auctions has not yet been adequately addressed. An outstanding distinction-one that turns out to be a key challenge-in firstprice auctions is that a bidder needs to learn about the bids of other bidders, which is unnecessary in second-price auctions as a result of the truthful nature. In this paper, we aim to fill in this gap and make the first attempt to establish the optimal bidding strategy which minimizes the bidder's regret. Specifically, we consider learning in repeated first-price auctions with censored feedback, where the private values of the bidder may vary over time. The feedback is censored because we work with the more realistic (and hence more challenging) setting where only the highest bid-the bid at which the transaction takes place-can be observed at the end of each round: a bidder cannot observe others' bids when she is the winner on a given round. Further, the bidder is competing against a strong oracle, one that knows the underlying distribution of the others' highest bid and hence can bid optimally at each time. In order for the bidder to learn from the history, we only assume that the highest bids of others are stochastic and follow an unknown iid distribution.
Key Challenge
The key challenge in this problem lies in censored feedback and its impact on the learning process: if the bidder bids a good price that wins, then she would not learn anything about the others' highest bid. This is the curse of censored feedback, which presents an exploration-exploitation trade-off that is distinct from and much more challenging than that of the standard contextual bandits (where one still observes the outcome that contributes to learning the model for any action taken).
To further appreciate the difficulty of the problem, let's start by thinking about how an explorethen-commit algorithm, perhaps the first algorithm that comes to one's mind after some thinking, would perform. In an optimized explore-then-commit algorithm, the learner would first spend O(T 2/3 ) rounds bidding 0 (the lowest possible bid), observe the highest bid each time and (hence be able to) learn the underlying highest bid distribution to within an accuracy of O(T −1/3 ). The regret incurred for this period is O(T 2/3 ), since it's purely exploration and hence constant regret per round. Now, equipped with the O(T −1/3 ) estimation accuracy of the highest bid distribution, in the remaining O(T ) rounds, the bidder, by pure exploitation, will incur total regret O(T · T −1/3 ) = O(T 2/3 ). Hence, the total regret is O(T 2/3 ) (and a moment of thought reveals that the division at O(T 2/3 ) is the best one can hope for the explore-then-commit style algorithm).
However, it is unclear as to whether one can do better than this simple algorithm (could O(T 2/3 ) be a fundamental limit in the presence of censored feedback?). It is mainly because that this problem, despite the fact that it can be easily formulated as a contextual bandits problem (when treating the private values as contexts, bids as actions and payoffs are rewards) [BZ09, RZ10, GZ11, AHK + 14, ADL16] , cannot be solved directly by any UCB-type [LCLS10, FCGS10, CLRS11, JBNW17, LLZ17] or Thompson sampling algorithms [AG13a, AG13b, RVR14, RVR16, AAGZ17] therein to achieve better regret bounds: the underlying estimation problem is fundamentally different from that of the standard contextual bandits due to censored feedback. Consequently, obtaining optimal learning algorithms in this setting has remained an open problem.
Our Contributions
Our contributions are threefold.
First, when the private values follow any iid distribution, we provide the first minimax optimal (up to log factors) learning algorithm: it achieves O( √ T log 2 T ) regret (Theorem 1) and we provide a matching lower bound of Ω( √ T ) (Theorem 6). We do so by heavily exploiting the structural properties of first-price auctions: 1) the optimal bid never decreases when the private value increases; 2) once we know the payoff under a certain bid, then irrespective of whether this bid wins or loses, we know the payoff of any larger bid. Our main insight is that these two properties-simple as they look-can be fruitfully exploited to yield optimal learning guarantees. In fact, to drive this point home and to push the agenda further, we abstract out these two properties and consider a broader class of problems-which we call monotone group contextual bandits-that contains first-price auctions as a special case. Monotone group contextual bandits are a particular class of (non-parametric) contextual bandits that crystallize the above two generalized properties regarding optimal actions and reward feedback. For this class of problems, we give a learning algorithm and show that it achieves O( √ T log 2 T ) regret (Theorem 3), for the case where the contexts follow an iid distribution. Second, we study the fundamental limit of learning on monotone group contextual bandits, and show that when the contexts are chosen adversarially, the worst-case regret is at least Ω(T 2/3 ). This lower bound clarifies the importance of the contexts generation mechanism: without any statistical regularity of the contexts, the problem is inherently more difficult. We obtain this lower bound via a novel argument that delicately translates the underlying exploration-exploitation tradeoff to the hardness of the problem: if the average regret is small, then the learner has not explored enough to distinguish among the alternatives, which in turn incurs a large average regret. Note that this is different from the typical (Ω( √ T )-type) lower bound arguments in the bandits literature, where the learner's inability of distinguishing the alternatives is independent of the final regret attained.
Third, perhaps even more suprisingly, we show that O( √ T ) regret is achievable even when the private values are chosen adversarially. That the private values can arrive arbitrarily-on top of censored feedback-certainly makes obtaining an O( √ T )-regret bound much more challenging: this breaks a key link in the stochastic private sequence setting-a link that allows the two structural (monotonicity) properties to be appropriately exploited-and hence renders inapplicable the previous algorithm and the regret bound. But what really makes an O( √ T )-regret bound unlikely-if not outright hopeless-is the Ω(T 2/3 ) lower bound we have just established for monotone group contextual bandits when the contexts (corresponding to private values) are chosen adversarially. Despite these seemingly insurmountable hurdles, we further exploit a somewhat hidden correlation-among-rewards property of first-price auctions-which is absent in a general monotone group contextual bandit-and put it into productive use. Specifically, we recognize that bidding at a high price-despite being uninformative for payoffs obtained under lower bids-does provide some partial feedback, as a result of the underlying correlation. Building on this insight, we provide an interval-splitting scheme that estimates the unknown highest bid distribution via a dynamic partition scheme: the CDF of the distribution is estimated on an appropriately chosen set of partitioning intervals, where each interval has a certain number of data samples falling into it that is just sufficient to estimate the probability of that interval to required accuracy. Further, we develop a novel high-probability concentration bound (Lemma 5) for these dependent estimated probabilities of the partitioned intervals-that combines the theory of self-normalized martingales, negative association of dependent random variables, and a geometric partitioning, all of which can be of independent interest-and use it to construct a special upper confidence bound, which guides the exploration in an effective manner. Putting all these pieces together yields the learning algorithm IS-UCB (Algorithm 2), which achieves O( √ T log 5 T ) regret (Theorem 2) and is hence minimax optimal (up to log factors) as a result of the Ω( √ T ) lower bound given in Theorem 6.
Related Work
Modeling repeated auctions as bandits has a long history and has inspired a remarkable line of work [BKRW04, DK09, BSS14, MM14, CBGM14, BKS15, MM15, WPR16, RW19, ZC20] that lies at the intersection between learning and auctions. In these works, the auctions are typically modeled as multi-armed bandits without any contexts, where the competing oracle can only choose a fixed action. At the same time, some works did consider the censored feedback structure in different auction settings. In [CBGM14] , the seller can observe the second highest bid only if she sets a reserve price below it in the second-price auction. In [WPR16] , the bidder in the second-price auction can update her private valuation of the good only when she makes the highest bid and gets the good. In [ZC19, ZC20] , the authors proposed a one-sided full-information structure in stochastic bandits where there is an order relationship between actions and choosing an action reveals the rewards of all larger actions, with applications in the second-price auction. Beyond the auction setting, the multi-armed bandit problem with general feedback structures (also known as the partial monitoring setting) was studied in [KNVM14,ACBDK15,ACBG + 17], where the regret dependence on the number of actions is determined by the independence number or the weak dominating number of the feedback graph.
For partial feedback in contextual bandits, we are only aware of one work [CBGGG17] , which studied a one-sided full feedback structure under the setting of online convex optimization and proved an Θ(T 2/3 ) bound on the minimax regret. Our definition of the monotone group contextual bandit is a generalization of [ZC19] to the contextual setting, and also of [CBGGG17] to the bandit setting-but equipped with more structures-where the regret can be improved to Θ(T 1/2 ) for stochastic contexts.
We also review some literature on censored observations. In dynamic pricing, a binary feedback indicating whether an item is sold to a particular buyer was studied in [KL03, CBCP18] , where they derived the optimal regret using multi-armed bandits. In particular, their results imply that if only a binary feedback is revealed in the first-price auction (i.e. whether the bidder wins or not), even under an identical private value of the bidder over time the worst-case regret is at least Ω(T 2/3 ). Consequently, this result-together with ours-indicates the crucial role of observing the winning bid, for the lack of it would worsen the O( √ T ) regret to Ω(T 2/3 ). A non-binary feedback structure similar to ours occurs in the newsvendor problem with censored demand [HR09, BM13] , where only the demand below the current level of supply is directly observable. Under this stronger feedback structure, the above works obtained the optimal Θ( √ T ) expected regret in the worst case. However, in addition to this setting being non-contextual, the policies in the above works-built around the well-known online gradient descent algorithm in the online convex optimization literature-made a crucial use of the special properties that their utility function is convex and more importantly, that the cost function's derivative is directly observable. In contrast, in our first-price auction problem, the utility function can even be discontinuous and the derivatives are not observable, hence rendering the algorithms and analyses from that literature inapplicable.
Problem Formulation
In this section, we consider the problem of online learning in repeated first-price auctions where only the bid at which the transaction takes place is observed at each time. We start with a quick summary in Section 2.1 of the notation used throughout the paper. We then provide a detailed description of the problem setup in Section 2.2 and describe the main results of the paper in Section 2.3.
Notations
For a positive integer n, let [n] {1, 2, · · · , n}. For a real number x ∈ R, let ⌈x⌉ be the smallest integer no smaller than x. For a square-integrable random variable X, let E[X] and Var(X) be the expectation and variance of X, respectively. For any event A, let ½(A) be the indicator function of A which is one if the event A occurs and zero otherwise. For probability measures P and Q defined on the same probability space, let P − Q TV = 1 2 |dP − dQ| and D KL (P Q) = dP log dP dQ be the total variation distance and the Kullback-Leibler (KL) divergence between P and Q, respectively. We also adopt the standard asymptotic notations: for non-negative sequences {a n } and {b n }, we write a n = O(b n ) if lim sup n→∞ a n /b n < ∞, a n = Ω(b n ) if b n = O(a n ), and a n = Θ(b n ) if both a n = O(b n ) and a n = Ω(b n ). We also adopt the notations O(·), Ω(·), Θ(·) to denote the respective meanings above within multiplicative poly-logarithmic factors in n.
Problem Setup
We consider a stochastic setting of a repeated first-price auction with censored feedbacks. Specifically, we focus on a single bidder in a large population of bidders during a time horizon T . At the beginning of each time t = 1, 2, · · · , T , the bidder sees a particular good and receives a private value v t ∈ [0, 1] for this good. Based on her past observations of other bidders' bids, the bidder bids a price b t ∈ [0, 1] for this good, and also let m t ∈ [0, 1] be the maximum bid of all other bidders. The outcome of the auction is as follows: if b t ≥ m t , the bidder gets the good and pays her bidding price b t ; if b t < m t , the bidder does not get the good and pays nothing 1 . Consequently, the instantaneous reward (or utility) of the bidder is
(1)
As for the feedback information structure, we assume that only the highest bid is revealed at the end of time t, i.e. the bidder does not observe others' highest bid m t if she wins and observes m t if she loses. This can be viewed as an informational version of the winner's curse [CCC71] where the winner has less information to learn for the future, and the feedback available to the bidder at time t is both ½(b t ≥ m t ) and m t ½(b t < m t ). The above structure holds in a number of practical first-price auctions where only the final transaction price is announced [Esp08] .
Next we specify the assumptions on the maximum bids m t and private values v t . To model the bids of other bidders, we assume that the maximum bids m t are iid random variables drawn from an unknown cumulative distribution function (CDF) G(·), with G(x) = P(m t ≤ x). The main rationale behind this assumption is that there is potentially a large population of bidders, and on average their valuations and bidding strategies are static over time, and in particular, independent of a single bidder's private valuation. Moreover, the iid assumption makes the learning possible for the bidder, so that in the sequel she can compete against a strong oracle who may make time-varying bids. There are two possible modelings for the private values v t . One model is that the private values (v t ) t∈[T ] are stochastic and iid drawn from some unknown distribution F . A stronger model is that
is an adversarial sequence taking value in [0, 1] which is chosen by an adaptive adversary, who has the perfect knowledge of the bidder's strategy and may choose v t based all observations (v s , b s , m s ) s<t before time t.
Based on the above assumptions, the expected reward of the bidder at time t is
The regret of the bidder is defined to be the difference in the cumulative rewards of the bidder's bidding strategy and the optimal bidding strategy which has the perfect knowledge of G(·), i.e.,
where π denotes the overall bidding policy, and v = (v 1 , · · · , v T ) is a given sequence of private values received by the bidder. The objective of the bidder is to devise a bidding policy π which minimizes the expected regret E[R T (π; v)] for a given sequence v of private values, subject to the censored feedback structure. When v is stochastic, the expectation E[R T (π; v)] in the expected regret in (3) is taken jointly over the randomness of both the bidding strategy π and v. In contrast, when the private value sequence v is chosen adversarily, the bidder aims to achieve a uniformly small expected regret E[R T (π; v)] regardless of v.
Main Results
Our first result shows that, under stochastic private values, an O( √ T ) expected regret is attainable.
Theorem 1. Let v 1 , · · · , v T be iid drawn from any unknown distribution F . Then there exists a bidding policy π (the MSE policy constructed in Section 3.2) satisfying
where the expectation is taken jointly over the randomness of v and the policy π, and C > 0 is an absolute constant independent of the time horizon T and the CDFs (F, G).
In fact, the regret bound in Theorem 1 is valid for a general class of monotone group contextual bandit problems (cf. Definitions 1 and 2) including the first-price auctions. However, we also show that if one is restricted to the larger family above, for non-stochastic value sequences the worst-case regret is lower bounded by Ω(T 2/3 ) (cf. Theorem 4). Hence, we propose another bidding strategy tailored specifically for the first-price auctions to achieve an O( √ T ) regret (with a slightly worse logarithmic factor) under adversarial private values.
Theorem 2. Let v 1 , · · · , v T be any value sequence in [0, 1] which may be chosen by an adaptive adversary. Then there exists a bidding policy π (the IS-UCB bidding policy in Section 4.2) with
where the expectation is only taken with respect to the randomness of the policy π, and C > 0 is an absolute constant independent of the time horizon T , the value sequence v and the unknown CDF G.
To the best of the authors' knowledge, the above theorems present the first O( √ T ) regret bidding strategies for general unknown CDF G in the first-price auction. The Ω( √ T ) lower bound for the regret is standard even under the full-information scenario where m t is always revealed at each time, and for completeness we include the proof in Appendix B.
Learning in Monotone Group Contextual Bandits
In this section, we formulate repeated first-price auctions as a particular type of bandits that has special structures not investigated in the existing bandits literature, and show that the regret bound of Theorem 1 is achievable for all such problems. Specifically, Section 3.1 motivates and presents the defining characteristics of monotone group contextual bandits, which include the first-price auctions as a special case. Subsequently in Section 3.2, we propose an online learning algorithm for monotone group contextual bandits, called Monotone Successive Elimination (MSE), and show in Section 3.3 that if the contexts are iid drawn from any unknown distribution, the expected regret bound in Theorem 1 holds. Finally, in Section 3.4, we characterize the fundamental learning limits in monotone group contextual bandits by presenting a worst-case Ω(T 2/3 ) regret lower bound.
Monotone Group Contextual Bandits
We build up to our principal object of study by first defining a group contextual bandit model.
Definition 1 (Group Contextual Bandits). A (finite) group contextual bandit consists of a finite time horizon T ∈ N, a finite context space C, a finite action space A, and a joint reward distribution P supported on R M ×K with marginal distributions (P c,a ) c∈C,a∈A , not necessarily independent across c and a. The mean rewards are (R c,a ) c∈C,a∈A .
Learning and Feedback Model. At each t ∈ [T ]
, the learner receives a context c t ∈ C and chooses an action a t ∈ A based on c t and the historical observations. Nature then draws a reward vector r t = (r t,c,a ) c∈C,a∈A iid ∼ P and reveals a non-empty subset of entries of r t .
2. Regret. Let π = (a 1 , a 2 , . . . , a T ) be the overall policy used by the learner, then the regret is:
3. Contexts Generation. When c t 's are iid drawn from an underlying distribution supported on C, it is a group contextual bandits with stochastic contexts. When c t 's can be arbitrarily chosen, and in particular, by an adversary who observes the history, then it is a group contextual bandit with adversarial contexts.
Remark 1. The standard contextual bandit is a special case of the above defined group contextual bandit: in the former only a single reward (one that corresponds to the selected action) is observed at each t, while in the latter a set of rewards-including possibly those rewards corresponding to other contexts and/or actions-are observed. Equivalently, a group contextual bandit is also a collection of multi-armed bandits (each one corresponding to a context c ∈ C) with possibly correlated rewards, where correlation can occur both across arms and across the multi-armed bandits. Further, and importantly, one when selecting an action in one multi-armed bandit, one could potentially observe rewards from other actions in this bandit and/or the other bandits in this group.
For simplicity, we assume throughout the paper that P is supported on [0, 1] M ×K so that all rewards are between 0 and 1. Everything generalizes straightforwardly to any subGaussian distribution.
Remark 2. Let |C| = M, |A| = K. In the standard contextual bandit model (where only the reward r t,ct,at of the chosen action a t under the current context c t is observed), it is known that the minimax optimal regret is Θ( √ M KT ), which is typically much greater than Θ( √ T ) for large M and K. However, surprisingly, for a subclass of group contextual bandits defined in Definition 2 (to which first-price auctions belong), Θ( √ T ) regret is in fact achievable: at a high level, this is because one can intelligently exploit the additional feedback that is present in the structured set of rewards revealed to the learner.
To motivate this subclass of group contextual bandits, we start by describing how learning in first-price acutions is a special instance of learning in a group contextual bandit. First, we note that the bids b t are the actions, and the private values v t are the contexts: let c t = v t and a t = b t , then the joint distribution P over the rewards (r t,c,a ) c∈C,a∈A is given by:
where m t iid ∼ G is a common random variable shared among all contexts and actions. Further, the mean rewards are R c,a = (c − a)G(a), which takes the same form as in (3). The only remaining issue is that the private values and bids come from the continuous space [0, 1], which we can deal with by adopting the following quantization scheme:
Note that any policy π Q on this quantized problem naturally results in a policy in the original (continuous-space) problem: when v t ∈ [0, 1] appears, first clip it to v t = min{v ∈ C : v ≥ v t } and apply π Q to get the bid for time t. This instantly raises an important question: how much performance degradation can this quantization cause? The answer is not much, as formalized by the following lemma.
Lemma 1. Let π Q be the overall policy for the quantized first-auction problem and π be the induced overall policy for the original problem.
Finally, to fully specify a group contextual bandit, we need to characterize which subset of rewards (r t,c,a ) c∈C,a∈A are revealed to the learner at each t, which is the key distinguishing factor here from a standard contextual bandit. To motivate the particular feedback structure that will be useful for our purposes, let us start by considering two key properties of the first-price auctions.
First, recall that the bidder receives partial information ½(b t ≥ m t ) and m t ½(b t < m t ) at the end of time t. One logical consequence here is that all indicator functions ½(b ≥ m t ) are also observable for any b ≥ m t , and so are the instantaneous rewards r
In other words, a bid b t not only reveals the reward for this particular bid under the value v t , but also reveals the rewards for all bids b ≥ b t and all values v. Consequently, this observation allows the learner to observe a whole set of rewards corresponding to all other contexts and all other actions that are larger.
Second, as a result of the specific form of the expected reward function (2), the optimal bid b ⋆ (v) = arg max b∈B R(v, b)-despite being an unknown function of the private value v due to the unknown CDF G-is in fact monotone in v, as formalized by the following lemma.
) be the optimal bid under the private value v ∈ [0, 1] (if there are multiple maximizers in the finite set A, we take the largest maximizer).
Lemma 2 simply states that, whenever the bidder has a higher valuation of an item, she is willing to bid a higher price for it. In other words, although the optimal bids b ⋆ (v) are unknown in general,
Based on the above two monotone properties, we characterize a sub-class of group contextual bandits as given in Definition 1.
Definition 2 (Monotone Group Contextual Bandits). A monotone group contextual bandit is a group contextual bandit satisfying:
1. Monotone Optimal Action. Let a ⋆ (c) = arg max a∈A R c,a be the optimal action under the context c, then a ⋆ (c) ≤ a ⋆ (c ′ ) as long as c ≤ c ′ ;
2. Monotone Feedback. If the learner chooses an action a t ∈ A at time t, then nature reveals the random rewards (r t,c,a ) c∈C,a≥at to the learner.
Note that in Definition 2, we assume an order relationship on both the contexts and the actions. Clearly, by the previous observations, the first-price auctions belong to monotone group contextual bandits. In the subsequent sections, we will show that an O( √ T log 2 T ) regret is attainable for all monotone group contextual bandits when the contexts are stochastic.
The MSE Policy
In this section, we propose a Monotone Successive Elimination (MSE) learning algorithm for a monotone group contextual bandit. Specifically, we maintain an active set of actions A c ⊆ A for each context c ∈ C indicating the set of candidate best actions under c, initialized to be the entire action space A. At each time t ∈ [T ], the learner receives the context c t and chooses the smallest action a t ∈ A ct : this action provides information for all other actions a ∈ A ct thanks to the monotone feedback structure. Then we update the empirical mean rewards of all context-action pairs (c, a) ∈ C × A based on the revealed rewards (r t,c,a ) c∈C,a≥at . Finally, we update the active sets A c based on the following rules:
1. Eliminate all actions which are smaller than the smallest action in A c−1 , with the convention
, with the natural ordering on integers); 2. Eliminate all probably suboptimal actions which perform much worse than the best action.
The first rule relies on the monotone optimal action property in Definition 2, as actions too small to be optimal under context c − 1 are also too small to be optimal under a larger context c. This rule ensures that the mapping c → min A c is also non-decreasing, and therefore choosing the smallest action in A c contributes one fresh observation for the quality of all actions a ∈ A c ′ with larger contexts c ′ ≥ c, which is crucial to providing enough data samples for large contexts. The second rule eliminates bad actions when sufficient evidence is present, and "much worse" is quantified in the confidence bound in Equation (6). Note that since the very first action chosen will always be the smallest action 1 irrespective of which context is drawn on t = 1, the quantity n t c,a will always be positive for all t ≥ 1. The overall policy is displayed in Algorithm 1.
The next theorem summarizes the performance of MSE in monotone group contextual bandits.
Theorem 3. For any monotone group contextual bandit with c 1 , · · · , c T iid drawn from any unknown distribution F , if γ ≥ 3 in MSE, then:
Theorem 3 shows that as long as the contexts are stochastic, MSE achieves an expected regret of O( √ T log 2 T ): that the near-optimal O( √ T ) regret is achievable for monotone group contextual bandits shows the benefits brought forth by the monotone structures, which yield the much sharper log(KM ) dependence rather than the O( √ KM) dependence under the standard bandit feedback. We show that how Theorem 3 implies Theorem 1 for first-price auctions, while leaving the proof of Theorem 3 to the next subsection. Let π MSE be the policy for the quantized first-price auction using the quantization scheme given in (5), and let π be the induced policy (via clipping and as in Lemma 1) for the original first-price auction. Since the private values v t are iid, the quantizations v t are iid as well. Consequently, adopting the same notation as in Lemma 1, Theorem 3 immediately
is exactly the regret in the quantized first-price auction problem (and hence corresponds to group contextual bandits' regret as defined in Definition 1) under the MSE policy. Therefore, taking M = K = ⌈ √ T ⌉, Lemma 1 implies that
thereby leading to Theorem 1. 
The learner receives the context c t ∈ C;
The learner chooses the smallest action a t = min A ct ;
The learner receives random rewards (r t,c,a ) c∈C,a≥at ; for c = 1, 2, . . . , M do for a = a t , a t + 1, . . . , K dō r t c,a ← n t−1 c,a n t−1 c,a + 1r t−1 c,a + r t,c,a n t−1 c,a + 1 , n t c,a ← n t−1 c,a + 1.
Letr t c,max = max a∈Acr t c,a , and n t c,max be the corresponding count;
end end end
Analysis of the MSE Policy
This section is devoted to the proof of Theorem 3. Define the following "good" event, which roughly says all empirical rewards concentrate around their true means:
Why is G a good event? Because of the following two reasons.
1. When G holds, each active set A c does not eliminate the optimal action a ⋆ (c) = arg max a∈A R c,a during the entire time horizon. As such, as the learning algorithm proceeds, progress towards shrinking to optimal action sets is being made, since only bad actions are removed.
2. When G holds, each (c, a) is visited sufficiently many times during the entiere learning horizon even though this context c has only infrequently appeared and/or this action a has seldomly been selected. More specifically, the number of times (c, a) is visited by time t satisfies:
for all actions a ∈ A c which remain active at the end of time t.
Let's quickly discuss why the above two properties are true. For the first property, note that actions are eliminated at two places: first, all actions in A c that are less than min A c−1 are eliminated; second, each action a in A c is eliminated whenr t c,a is smaller thanr c,max by a large margin. From the monotonicity condition, we know that a ⋆ (c + 1) ≥ a ⋆ (c) ≥ min A c ; consequently, if the optimal action of A c hasn't been eliminated, then the first elimination rule cannot eliminate the optimal action of A c+1 . Further, since A 0 = A, the optimal action of A 1 can never be eliminated by the first elimination rule; hence, by induction, the first elimination rule never discards an optimal action for any active action set A c . Next, on the event G, we have: r t c,a − R c,a ≤ (n t c,a ) − 1 2 γ log(KM T ) for every a. As such, let a ⋆ t and a max t denote the true optimal action and the empirical optimal action. We then haver
Hence an optimal action can never be eliminated by this second rule either. For the second property, note that the first elimination rule forces the map c → min A c to be non-decreasing in c ∈ C. Hence, whenever c s ≤ c at some time s ≤ t, the reward of the (c, a) pair will be observed at time s for any action a ∈ A c at the end of time t, for the action selected at s will be the minimum action of A cs (and a of course is larger than this minimum action). In addition, we always have a 1 = 1, and therefore all action-context pairs can be observed at the first time step. This gives the inequality (8). Of course, one can still observe the reward of the (c, a) pair at s even if c s > c (and this is why it is a lower bound of n t c,a ): this can happen if the minimum action of A cs is less than a. However, as it turns out, just counting the number of times c s is no larger than c already characterizes the fact that we have observed (c, a) sufficiently many times. The following lemma formalizes this "sufficiently many times" intuition, which will be an important ingredient in the proof of the final regret upper bound.
Lemma 3. Let X 1 , · · · , X T be iid real-valued random variables. Then
Remark 3. Note that the above inequality holds regardless of the common distribution of X 1 , · · · , X T .
Intuitively, this is because the quantity 1 + 2≤s≤t−1 ½(X s ≤ X t ) will typically be linear in t as the joint distribution of (X 1 , · · · , X t ) is exchangeable.
The above discussion establishes that G is clearly a desirable event, one that (as it turns out) contains all the necessary ingredients for the algorithm to have small regret. However, this good event would be vacuous if it is unlikely to happen. Fortunately, as the next lemma indicates, this is not the case and G occurs with high probability. However, since the action a t may depend on the realization of the past rewards (r s,c,a ) s<t , the numerator is not a sum of independent random variables when conditioned on the denominator. Consequently, the usual Hoeffding's inequality (which would have routinely yielded the desired bound under iid assumption) does not apply here for the concentration ofr t c,a . As such, we develop an approach that utilizes self-normalized martingales to bypass this conditional dependency. See appendix for the detailed proof.
We are now in a position to establish the upper bound for R T (π) as stated in Theorem 3. Proof of Theorem 3. Conditioned on G, the action a t , we have ∀t ≥ 2:
.
Moreover, the fact that action a t passes the test (6) under context c t at time t − 1 implies
where the last inequality is due to (8). Combining the above inequalities yields to
and therefore conditioning on G,
where the last inequality is due to the concavity of x → √ x. As a result, the claimed regret bound in Theorem 3 follows from (9), Lemma 3, and the high probability result in Lemma 4.
Limitations and Lower Bounds
Recall that the crux of the proof of Theorem 3 is that with one-sided feedbacks, the small actions chosen under small contexts provide full information of the large actions chosen under large contexts. Therefore, the ideal scenario is that the contexts come in an increasing order, where each early action made by MSE provides full feedbacks for later actions. In contrast, there also exists a worst scenario where the contexts are decreasing over time, so the early actions are typically large and essentially provide no information for later actions. Theorem 3 shows that, in the average scenario where the contexts follow any iid distribution, an O( √ T ) expected regret is possible leaving the dependence on (K, M ) logarithmic. However, the following result shows that, for the worst-case contexts, an Ω(T 2/3 ) regret is unavoidable for general monotone group contextual bandits. 
where the supremum is taken over all possible monotone group contextual bandits (cf. Definition 2) with reward distribution P and all possible context sequences (c t ) t∈[T ] , the infimum is taken over all possible policies, and c > 0 is an absolute constant independent of (K, M, T ). In particular, the reward distribution P may be chosen such that |R c,a −R c,a ′ | ≤ |a−a ′ |/K and |R c,a −R c ′ ,a | ≤ |c−c ′ |/M for all c, c ′ ∈ C, a, a ′ ∈ A.
Theorem 4 shows that, if we only formulate the first-price auction as a monotone group contextual bandit (even in the presence of the Lipschitz properties of the expected rewards in (2) on both arguments), there is no hope to achieve an O( √ T ) regret for the worst-case private values 2 . Therefore, additional structures in addition to the monotone feedback for the first-price auction are still necessary, which is the main topic of the next section.
We use a Bayesian approach to prove Theorem 4: we will construct 2 M reward distributions P ε indexed by ε ∈ {±1} M , and show that under the uniform mixture of these reward distributions, no single policy can incur an average regret smaller than Ω(T 2/3 ). The derivation of the above average lower bound requires a delicate exploration-exploitation tradeoff: we show that if the average regret is small, then the learner does not have enough exploration to distinguish among the components of the mixture and in turn incurs a large average regret. Note that this is different from typical lower bounds in the bandit literature, where the disability of distinguishing among the components (or multiple hypotheses) for the learner is independent of the final regret she attains.
Assume that M = T 1/3 and K = 2M , for fewer actions and contexts are always helpful for the learner (without loss of generality we assume that M is an integer). Consider the following context 
where the mean rewards are given by Next we consider a uniform mixture on the reward distributions:
where (P ε ) ⊗t denotes the probability distribution of all observables up to time t under the reward distribution P ε . Similarly, for each component m ∈ [M ] and t ∈ [T ], we define
as the mixture distributions conditioning on ε m = 1 and ε m = −1, respectively. For any policy π, we will prove two lower bounds on the worst-case regret R T sup P,{ct} t∈[T ] E[R T (π)] which together lead to Theorem 4. First, by the third property of the reward distribution P ε ,
where c m = M + 1 − m is the context during the time block T m , and (x) + max{x, 0}. The second lower bound of R T is more delicate. Using the second observation,
where (a) is due to Le Cam's first lemma P (A)+Q(A c ) ≥ 1− P −Q TV , (b) follows from Lemma 8, and (c) follows from the joint convexity of the KL divergence in both arguments and the definition of the mixture in (11), where ε c is obtained from ε by flipping the c-th coordinate of ε. Note that the distributions P ε and P ε cm only differ in the reward under the context c m ∈ [M ] and the action a cm,− = 2c m − 1, which is observable at time s < t if and only if a s ≤ a cm,− due to the one-sided feedback structure. Hence,
where (d) follows from the chain rule of the KL divergence, and (e) is due to D KL (Bern(p) Bern(q)) ≤ 8(p − q) 2 whenever p, q ∈ [1/4, 3/4]. Combining (13), (14) and the definition of the mixture P with the fact that 2T /(K 2 M ) = 1/2, we have
Finally, we show that any regret R T satisfying both the lower bounds (12) and (15) must be of the order Ω(T 2/3 ). In fact, by the convexity of x → exp(−x), the inequality (15) gives
Since for any m ′ ∈ [M ] and a ∈ [K], it holds that
a combination of (12) and (16) gives the final inequality for R T :
where the target regret R T appears at both sides of the inequality (17). Roughly speaking, the exponent 2R T /(KM ) quantifies the level of exploration achieved by the policy π, and a small regret R T indicates a poor exploration of the policy. Finally, plugging the choices of parameters (M, K) into (17) we conclude that R T ≥ T 2/3 /(32e), establishing Theorem 4.
chosen by an adaptive adversary who keeps track of the learning process of the bidder. Surprisingly, we show that an O( √ T ) expected regret can be achieved in this setting by designing a learning algorithm, which we call Interval-Splitting UCB (IS-UCB), that matches this bound. This learning algorithm, in addition to leveraging the monotone groups contextual bandit structures, also exploits the additional property-correlated rewards among actions-that is unique in the current setup to further improve the learning performance and reduce the regret. We provide a high-level sketch of the main idea in Section 4.1, and detail the IS-UCB policy in Section 4.2. The regret analysis of the IS-UCB policy requires a high-probability confidence bound for the sum of dependent selfnormalized martingales and a combinatorial inequality, both of which are placed in Section 4.3.
Main Idea: Correlated Rewards and Interval Splitting
The lower bound in Theorem 4 shows that learning with adversarial private value sequences cannot be handled purely using a generic monotone group contextual bandit structure. That is because, at the generality of a generic monotone group contextual bandit, one only has monotonicity-both actionwise and feedbackwise-at hand, and hence, choosing one action reveals either complete information or no information about the mean reward of another action. However, as we shall see, the rewards of different actions in first-price auctions are actually correlated, and therefore choosing an action may reveal partial information of another action, even if no information would be revealed under the monotone group contextual bandits feedback structure.
To highlight the main idea, we first recall the key insights of the MSE policy (specialized to first-price auctions). Specifically, it makes use of the crucial fact that the outcome of bidding low prices provides full information for the rewards of bidding high prices, and this one-sided feedback structure helps to achieve regret that depends only logarithmically on the number of contexts and actions (i.e. K and M ). Mathematically, observing the partial information of m t as a result of bidding b t gives perfect knowledge of ½(m t ≤ b) for any b ≥ b t ; therefore, bidding b t contributes to estimating the CDF G(b) (and hence the mean reward of bidding b) for all b ≥ b t . The drawback of this one-sided feedback structure, however, is that since the observations corresponding to large bids provides no help in estimating CDF at smaller bids, there may not be enough observations available for estimating G(b) for small b. Consequently, this can lead to large regret, especially when the value sequence is chosen adversarially to yield decreasing b t 's over time.
Despite this hurdle, which is insurmountable in a generic monotone group contextual bandit, our key insight in this section is that bidding high prices in fact provides partial information for the rewards of bidding low prices: for any two bids b 1 and b 2 , the random reward
Therefore the former observation may help infer part of the latter, even if b 1 > b 2 . We exploit this additional structure in first-price auctions via the following interval splitting scheme.
A Novel Interval-Splitting Scheme
Since the only unknown in the reward R(v, b) in (2) is G(b) = P(m t ≤ b), we may reduce the reward estimation problem to the estimation of G, or equivalently the complementary CDF (CCDF) G(b) = P(m t > b). We do so via interval splitting: for b < b ′ , we writē
Now comes the crucial insight in leveraging this probability decomposition in (18). On the one hand, since b ′ > b, the second quantity P(m t > b ′ ) can be estimated with more precision, since more observations are available for b ′ than b. On the other hand, although the number of samples for estimating P(b < m t ≤ b ′ ) is the same as that for estimatingḠ(b) in the MSE policy, the target probability to be estimated becomes smaller:
How does a smaller target probability help? It helps because the estimation error is smaller using the same number of samples (compared to a larger target probability). The intuition can best be obtained from the example of coin-tossing. If a coin has a small bias p, then after tossing it n times, the empirical mean estimate would deviate from the true bias by O( p/n) (with high probability), since the variance of the empirical mean estimator is p/n. Consequently, all else equal, the smaller the bias, the easier it is to obtain an accurate estimate. This observation, when properly applied in our current setting, leads to the fact that the smaller P(b < m t ≤ b ′ ) can be estimated accurately even if not enough samples are available. As such, the decomposition (18) motivates us to estimate these probabilities separately to achieve better accuracy: the second quantity corresponds to the correlation in the rewards where information from more samples is provided, and the first quantity has a smaller magnitude and therefore enjoys a smaller estimation error as well.
Taking one step further, the decomposition (18) can be extended over multiple intervals in a dynamic way over time. Specifically, let P t = {b 1 , . . . , b t } be the set of split points of the interval [0, 1] at the end of time t. For the sake of this discussion, we assume the b t 's are distinct (duplicate bids can be handled easily and will be covered by the final algorithm discussed in the next subsection). Let b σ(1) , . . . , b σ(t) be a permutation of b 1 , · · · , b t that is increasing. With the convention b 0 = 0, b t+1 = 1, σ(0) = 0, σ(t + 1) = t + 1, it immediately follows that for any candidate bid b ∈ (b σ(s) , b σ(s+1) ] with 0 ≤ s ≤ t, we have:
With this decomposition, we can estimate P(b σ(s ′ ) < m t ≤ b σ(s ′ +1) ) using the empirical frequency computed from the past observations as follows (note that m σ(ℓ) is only observed when m σ(ℓ) > b σ(ℓ) ):
Note that only the first s ′ observations are used in the above estimate, for m σ(ℓ) with ℓ > s ′ is either outside the interval (b σ(s ′ ) , b σ(s ′ +1) ] when it is observed, or with an unknown membership in the interval (b σ(s ′ ) , b σ(s ′ +1) ] when it is only known that m σ(ℓ) ≤ b σ(ℓ) . Either way, these remaining observations cannot contribute to the estimation of P(b σ(s ′ ) < m t ≤ b σ(s ′ +1) ). Glancing at this line of reasoning, we see that the sample sizes in each partition are different and adaptively chosen based on the previous bids. In particular, the reward of bidding b is estimated by combining the local estimates with different sample sizes.
Finally, based on the estimated rewards, the bidder picks the bid b t+1 for the time t + 1, and update the partition as P t+1 = P t ∪ {b t+1 }. Repeating the previous estimation procedure on P t+1 shows that, bidding a high price b t+1 provides partial information for a lower price b in the sense that an additive component ofḠ(b), i.e.,Ḡ(b t+1 ), can now be estimated using one more observation.
The IS-UCB Policy
The above interval-splitting scheme provides an efficient way of using past samples to estimate the CDF. We now integrate this estimation scheme into the bidding process to form the fully functional online learning algorithm IS-UCB (formally in Algorithm 2), explained in more detail below.
Algorithm 2: Interval-Splitting Upper Confidence Bound (IS-UCB) Policy
Input: Time horizon T ; action set B = {b 1 , · · · , b K } with b i = (i − 1)/K; tuning parameters γ, γ ′ > 0. Output: A resulting policy π. Initialization: Empirical probabilitiesp 0 i ← 0 and empirical counts n 0
The bidder receives v t ∈ [0, 1]; if t = 1 then The bidder bids b t = b 1 ; else
The bidder chooses the following bid:
end
The bidder receives ½(b t ≥ m t ) and m t ½(b t < m t );
end end end
First, we quantize the action space into K = ⌈ √ T ⌉ evenly spaced grid points B = {b 1 , · · · , b K }, which divides [0, 1] into K small intervals (b j , b j+1 ], with b K+1 := 1. For each (b j , b j+1 ], we count the number of past observations n j which contributes to estimating p j = P(b j < m t ≤ b j+1 )-these are observations from the time steps s ≤ t where b s ≤ b j -and from there compute the corresponding estimatep j accordingly. From these estimates, we can then easily recover the CDF: in particular,
Now, at time t, when receiving v t , we would ideally like to pick a bid b i in B to maximize the expected reward R
Of course, we do not know G(·), and a readily available estimate comes from Equation (20) as just discussed. However, despite the best efforts that went into making that estimate efficient via the interval-splitting scheme, distilled wisdom from the bandits literature would frown upon us if we had simply plug inĜ(b i ) and pick a maximizing b i thereafter, because to obtain a good estimateĜ, one must explore when bidding. That same distilled wisdom would suggest that using an upper confidence bound ofĜ-rather than G itself-could potentially be a good way to achieve exploration. Indeed, using an upper bound of G implies a certain level of optimism; it amounts to believing m t is more likely to be smaller than the current empirical estimate would suggest, thereby inducing the bidder to bid lower than what would have been bidded had a greedy selection underĜ been employed: If this belief turns out to be true, then the bidder gets a larger reward; otherwise, the bidder gets a valuable sample of other bidders' maximum bid that, when efficiently utilized (as discussed before), produces a good estimate of G(·).
As such, an immediate question-one that is key to all designs of UCB-based algorithms-naturally arises: how should one choose the upper confidence bound in this non-parametric setting? In our current case, this requires some careful thought, because the variance ofĜ(b)-a natural choice commonly adopted in the bandits literature-is difficult to determine, as a result of messy dependence created by the complex interval-splitting estimation scheme. By delicately exploiting the special structure of the probability estimates, we arrive at a particular form of the confidence bound (Equation (19) in Algorithm 2) at each t. As such, one can see that some quantity is being added toĜ(b i ) to form a corresponding optimistic estimate.
To motivate this confidence bound, we note that if the estimatesp j were independent, then:
Of course, we do not know p j and hence use the empirical estimatorp j in its replacement in the upper confidence bound. However, thep j 's are highly dependent: there are lots of dependence among the bids (b t , m t ) and the sample sizes n t j . Consequently, we introduced the last correction term, which, as we show in Lemma 5 in the following subsection, gives the upper confidence bound with high probability despite the presence of complex dependence. We remark in particular that the confidence bound in (19) used by IS-UCB makes efficient use of different sample sizes in different intervals.
We are next ready to characterize the learning performance of IS-UCB.
Theorem 5. Let the private values v 1 , · · · , v t be any sequence in [0, 1] chosen by an adaptive adversary. For γ ≥ 4, γ ′ ≥ 7, the regret of the IS-UCB policy satisfies
Clearly, the claim of Theorem 5 implies Theorem 2 and shows that an O( √ T ) regret is achievable under any private values.
Analysis of the IS-UCB Policy
This section is devoted to the proof of Theorem 5. We begin with some notation. For j ∈ [K], t ∈ [T ], letp t j and n t j be the empirical probability and counts, respectively, of the j-th interval at the end of time t in Algorithm 2, and let p j = G(b j+1 ) − G(b j ) be the true probability P(m t ∈ (b j , b j+1 ]) of the j-th interval. The following lemma shows that (19) provides a high probability upper bound of
Lemma 5. For γ ≥ 4 and γ ′ ≥ 7, with probability at least 1 − 2T −3 , the following inequality holds simultaneously for all i ∈ [K] and t ∈ [T ]:
The proof of Lemma 5 is very technically involved due to the following reasons:
1. Both quantitiesp t j and n t j are random variables and they are correlated; therefore, (21) provides a random upper bound of the estimation error with high probability;
2. The empirical probability for each interval
is the quotient of two dependent random variables, because the future bid b t may depend on previous outcomes (m s ) s<t ;
3. The empirical probabilities for different intervals are dependent as well, for the same observation m t is used multiple times for the computation ofp j for different j's.
To overcome the above difficulties, we express the differencep t j − p j as a self-normalized martingale, and employ the negative association amongp t j for different j's to obtain upper bounds of a suitable "moment generating function" of the random vector (p t i − p i , · · · , p t K − p K ). Finally, utilizing the non-decreasing property of j → n t j , we apply a discretization approach to establish the result. The complete and lengthy proof of Lemma 5 is relegated to the Appendix C.
With the help of Lemma 5, we are now in a position to analyze the regret of the IS-UCB policy. For t ≥ 2, let
be the length of the confidence band at time t for the chosen bid b t . By the first inequality (21) of Lemma 5, the objective function for each b ∈ B in (19) serves as a high probability upper bound of the instantaneous reward R(v t , b), and therefore the standard UCB-type arguments yield that the total regret is at most 1+2 T t=2 ℓ t with probability at least 1−2T −3 . Meanwhile, using |v t −b t | ≤ 1 and the second inequality (22) of Lemma 5, we have
with probability at least 1− 2T −3 , where the last step follows from Cauchy-Schwartz. The following combinatorial lemma provides a deterministic upper bound of the terms in (23).
Lemma 6. For any bid sequence b 1 , b 2 , · · · , b t ∈ B with b 1 = 0, and any j ∈ [K], it holds that
Note that Lemma 6 together with the fact K j=1 p j = 1 implies that
Hence, the inequality (23) shows that with probability at least 1 − 2T −3 ,
Finally, following the same quantization argument for the implication from Theorem 3 to Theorem 1, we apply Lemma 1 with the choice K = ⌈ √ T ⌉ to obtain the desired upper bound of Theorem 5. 
Lemma 8. Let P, Q be two probability measures on the same probability space. Then
Proof. The lemma follows from [Tsy08, Lemma 2.6] and the convexity of x → exp(−x).
Lemma 9 (Bennett's inequality [Ben62] ). Let X be a random variable with E[X] = 0, Var(X) = σ 2 and |X| ≤ 1 almost surely. Then for each λ ≥ 0,
Proof. If x > A + √ B, then
B Proof of the Regret Lower Bound
This section is devoted to the proof of the following Ω( √ T ) lower bound on the regret.
Theorem 6. Even in the special case where v t ≡ 1 and others' bids m t are always revealed at the end of each round, there exists an absolute constant c > 0 independent of T such that
where the supremum is taken over all possible CDFs G(·) of the others' bid m t , and the infimum is taken over all possible policies π.
The proof of Theorem 6 is the usual manifestation of the Le Cam's two-point method [Tsy08] . Consider the following two candidates of the CDFs supported on [0, 1]:
where ∆ ∈ (0, 1/4) is some parameter to be chosen later. In other words, the CDF G 1 corresponds to a discrete random variable taking value in {1/3, 2/3} with probability (1/2 + ∆, 1/2 − ∆), and the CDF G 2 corresponds to the probability (1/2 − ∆, 1/2 + ∆). Let R 1 (v t , b t ) and R 2 (v t , b t ) be the expected reward in (2) averaged under the CDF G 1 and G 2 , respectively. After some algebra, it is straightforward to check that
Hence, for any b t ∈ [0, 1], we have
The inequality (24) is the separation condition required in the two-point method: there is no single bid b t which gives a uniformly small instantaneous regret under both CDFs G 1 and G 2 . For i ∈ {1, 2}, let P t i be the distribution of all observables (m 1 , · · · , m t−1 ) at the beginning of time t. Then for any policy π,
where (a) is due to the fact that the maximum is no smaller than the average, (b) follows from (24), (c) is due to the identity min{dP, dQ} = 1 − P − Q TV , and (d) is due to the data-processing inequality P t 1 − P t 2 TV ≤ P T 1 − P T 2 TV for the total variation distance. Invoking Lemma 8 and using the fact that for ∆ ∈ (0, 1/4),
we have the following inequality on the total variation distance:
Finally, choosing ∆ = 1/(4 √ T ) and combining (25), (26), we conclude that Theorem 6 holds with the constant c = 1/(24e 2 ).
C Proof of the Concentration Inequality with Dependence

C.1 The Main Lemma
The proof of Lemma 5 relies on the following main lemma:
Lemma 11. With probability at least 1 − T −3 , the following inequality holds simultaneously for all i ∈ [K] and t ∈ [T ]:
This section is devoted to the proof of Lemma 11. By definition ofp t j , we have
Clearly (M j t ) t∈[T ] is a martingale adapted to the filtration F t = σ({v s , m s } s≤t ) for each j ∈ [K], for b t is F t−1 -measurable and m t is independent of F t−1 (even under an adaptive adversary). Moreover, the predictive quadratic variation of M j t is
Hence, by (28) and (29), the estimation error can be expressed as
The next lemma upper bounds the moment generating function of M j t using M j t .
Lemma 12. For each t ∈ [T ] and any λ = (λ 1 , λ 2 , · · · , λ K ) with non-negative entries, we have
Proof. By the tower property of conditional expectation, we have
Since the intervals (b j , b j+1 ] are disjoint, the indicator random variables Z j
are negatively associated conditioning on F t−1 [JDP83] . Moreover, due to the non-negativity of λ j , the mappings Z j   exp
Since |M j t − M j t−1 | ≤ 1 almost surely, Bennett's inequality (cf. Lemma 9) with (31), (32) gives
and repeating the above arguments until t = 0 gives the desired result.
Next we apply Lemma 12 and a suitable discretization argument to prove Lemma 11. Note that 1 ≤ n t j ≤ T for any j ∈ [K], t ∈ [T ], we partition the interval [1, T ] into L ℓ=1 I ℓ with I ℓ = [2 ℓ−1 , 2 ℓ ), where L = ⌈log 2 T ⌉. For a vector ℓ = (ℓ i , ℓ i+1 , · · · , ℓ K ) ∈ [L] K−i+1 , we associate an event E ℓ as
Let E be the collection of the above events E ℓ which are non-empty. Since j → n t j = t s=1 ½(b s ≤ b j )
is clearly non-decreasing, we conclude that E ℓ ∈ E only if ℓ i ≤ ℓ i+1 ≤ · · · ≤ ℓ K . As a result, the cardinality of E is at most the number of distinct non-decreasing sequence taking value in [L] with length at most K, which is further at most the number of non-negative integer solutions (x 1 , · · · , x L ) such that L ℓ=1 x ℓ ≤ K. Hence, |E| ≤ (K + 1) L ≤ e 2 log T log K . 
D.2 Proof of Lemma 2
Fix any v 1 , v 2 ∈ [0, 1] with v 1 ≤ v 2 . Then for any b ≤ b ⋆ (v 1 ), it holds that
where the inequality follows from the definition of b ⋆ (v 1 ) and the assumption b ≤ b ⋆ (v 1 ). Hence, all bids b ≤ b ⋆ (v 1 ) cannot be the largest maximizer of R(v 2 , b), and b ⋆ (v 1 ) ≤ b ⋆ (v 2 ) as claimed.
D.3 Proof of Lemma 4
By definition, we have n t c,a = t s=1 ½(a s ≤ a), and 
The main difficulty in proving (36) is that the choice of a t may depend on the previous observations {r s,c,a } s<t , and therefore the summands on the numerator are not mutually independent. However, if we define F t = σ({a s , c s , (r s,c,a ) c∈C,a∈A } s≤t ) to be the σ-field of the historic observations up to time t, then a t is F t−1 -measurable and r t,c,a is independent of F t−1 , and consequently Hence, applying Lemma 7 with y = 1 yields an upper bound (KM T ) −γ 2 /3 of the deviation probability in (36), which is no larger than (KM T ) −3 thanks to the assumption γ ≥ 3.
D.4 Proof of Lemma 3
Let F be the common CDF of the random variables X 1 , · · · , X T . Conditioning on X t , the sum 2≤s≤t−1 ½(X s ≤ X t ) follows a Binomial distribution B(t − 2, F (X t )), then using 
, 1 .
Since P(F (X t ) ≤ x) ≤ x for any x ∈ [0, 1], the random variable F (X t ) stochastically dominates U ∼ Unif([0, 1]). Applying the stochastic dominance result to the decreasing function x ∈ [0, 1] → min{1/((t − 1)x), 1} yields E min 1 (t − 1)F (X t )
, 1 ≤ E min 1 (t − 1)U , 1 = 1 + log(t − 1) t − 1 .
Now the proof is completed by
T t=2 1 + log(t − 1) t − 1 ≤ (1 + log T ) · T −1 t=1 1 t ≤ (1 + log T ) 2 .
D.5 Proof of Lemma 6
We first prove the first inequality. Since b t takes value in B, for each j ∈ [K] let m j := T t=2 ½(b t = b j ) be the number of times that the bid b j is selected starting from the second round. Then since
1 1 + 1 2 + · · · + 1 1 + m j ≤ K(1 + log T ).
For the second inequality, using the definition of n t−1 j we have
